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A B S T R A C T   
The conflicts and potential trade-offs between renewable energy development and nature protection are evident 
in policies aimed at promoting windpower, particularly in nature areas under high pressure from human ac-
tivities. However, surprisingly little is known about the influence of political steering on windpower licensing 
practices. This article examines how political steering has affected the weight accorded to environmental con-
siderations in the licensing practices of the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). We find 
that the NVE enjoys significant discretion in interpreting and implementing political decisions, and that the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) has not provided clear steering signals regarding nature protection. 
Political pressures for expanded renewable energy production are reflected in the significant attention paid to 
economic and technical considerations in the licensing process. We conclude that ministerial steering signals and 
the NVE’s technocratic culture have pushed in the same direction: greater development of windpower, at the 
expense of transparent and predictable consideration for nature concerns.   
1. Introduction 
The conflict and potential trade-offs between renewable energy 
development and nature protection are evident in policies aimed at 
promoting windpower. While both renewable energy development and 
nature protection are widely regarded as legitimate and important po-
litical objectives, combining the two may prove challenging, particu-
larly in regions under high pressure from human activities [1]. There is 
strong momentum for more windpower – but there is also increasing 
opposition from nature conservation organizations, recreational in-
terests and local communities. 
Political decisions should provide some guidance as to the prioriti-
zation of objectives and interests, depending on the licensing schemes in 
different jurisdictions. Whereas support schemes, R&D, tax benefits and 
similar political measures are important instruments for influencing the 
attractiveness of renewables investments, licensing decisions represent 
the arena where the trade-offs must be balanced [2]. Licensing practices 
– how the authorities perceive and weigh the benefits and drawbacks of 
windpower projects – ultimately decide which projects, locations and 
values will be realized, and are crucial to the development of the sector 
[3]. These practices also influence the degree of acceptance, perceived 
legitimacy and nature impact [4], but have been little studied. 
Several international and Nordic studies have shown that the orga-
nisation of the licensing process is important for issues like the 
weighting of difference concerns in the process, stakeholder influence, 
and the rate of deployment. Söderholm et al. [5] demonstrate how the 
legal-based Swedish system gives room for interpretation and decisional 
leeway based on legal interpretation. Darpö [6] shows that the Swedish 
licensing procedure for wind farms gives regional authorities and local 
municipalities much greater influence in the process compared to Nor-
way. Blindheim [7] argues that, in an early phase characterized by slow 
development of Norwegian windpower, political uncertainty caused a 
lack of political will to provide a predictable framework for windpower 
investments and the necessary resources for handling permit applica-
tions efficiently. Other findings indicate that the degree of hierarchical 
state steering influences windpower construction rates [8]. While legal 
provisions have been found to offer insufficient guidance as to the 
considerations made in the Swedish licensing process [8], Toke and 
others show how institutional differences influence windpower instal-
lation rates, without focusing on steering directly [9,10]. The length of 
the process also influences deployment rates and procedural predict-
ability [3,7]. Further, the weight accorded to various issues in the 
licensing process, procedural transparency and institutional coordina-
tion have been identified as significant factors influencing licensing 
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outcomes [2,11]. 
Many studies of windpower development have investigated social 
acceptance, perceptions of fairness and distributional justice, environ-
mental policy integration, deployment of new technologies, and energy 
democracy. By contrast, there has been less research on how the 
licensing authorities respond to political and ministerial steering signals, 
and how such signals affect licensing outcomes over time. Such signals 
may take many forms: here we focus on ministerial steering through 
annual allocation letters, direct orders or practice change or consider-
ations to make, and calibration of practice through the windpower 
licensing appeals process. The lack of studies on the ability of the po-
litical system to influence the licensing process through ministerial 
steering signals represents a significant research gap in the literature. 
This lacuna is puzzling, as licensing practices are well known to influ-
ence siting decisions as well as licensing process legitimacy [12,13]. To 
address this research gap, we ask: To what extent and how do political 
steering signals influence the weigh given to environmental consider-
ations in windpower licensing practices? 
We employ a qualitative research approach based on the case of 
windpower licensing in Norway, which is characterized by excellent 
wind resources and large wilderness areas. After a very slow start around 
1999, electricity production from onshore wind turbines has increased 
sharply in recent years. It has risen steeply – from ca. 1 TWh (less than 
1% of annual electricity production) by the end of 2010 to a projected 15 
TWh or some 10% of total annual electricity production by the end of 
2021 [14] – and has also become increasingly controversial. As of 
January 2021, Norway has more than 1100 wind turbines at 53 wind-
power plants, with an installed capacity of 3716 MW and an estimated 
12 TWh annual production [15]. The total planning area affected by 
windpower construction is 493 km2, which is two and half times as large 
as the area covered by other industrial installations in Norway. 
Although Norway already has a fully renewable electricity sector 
(mainly from hydropower) and an annual electricity surplus, there are 
pressures for installing greater renewables production to prepare for full 
electrification of transport, industry and other sectors. Norway’s elec-
tricity surplus is exported to other European countries, where it may 
replace fossil-based electricity. Moreover, Norway has large areas 
available for windpower development. On the other hand, windpower 
siting has become one of the most contentious issues in Norwegian 
politics, causing widespread protests at local, regional, and national 
levels. One manifestation of this conflict was the massive opposition 
from affected Norwegian municipalities to the government’s proposed 
national framework plan for windpower, which the government decided 
to scrap soon after presenting it in 2019. 
The conflicts between nature protection and climate concerns have 
taken centre stage in Norwegian windpower discussions, with calls for 
more transparent and predicable licensing practices related to envi-
ronmental concerns. These factors make Norway an excellent case for 
analysing political steering and licensing practices, as it provides an 
opportunity to study a centralized licensing system that could be ex-
pected to be sensitive to political steering signals. Moreover, as licensing 
authority lies with a national sector agency (NVE) under a ministry 
(OED), there is ample room for political steering signals to influence 
licensing practices. Hence, the case of Norway is both a pertinent study 
object in its own right and one that can generate wider lessons about 
how political steering influences licensing practices. This study is related 
to studies of system responsiveness to issues relating to renewables 
acceptance [16,17], perceptions of justice or fairness of the process 
[4,18], and environmental impact assessments [19], but such issues are 
beyond the scope of this article. 
We draw on implementation theory to investigate how political 
steering signals – ministry letters of allocation to its subsidiary agencies, 
renewables goals and appeals processes – influence licensing practices at 
the NVE. Such inputs may encounter resistance from established iden-
tities and practices, standard operating procedures, and the like. We pay 
particular attention to political signals regarding nature protection and 
changes in the weight accorded by the NVE to nature protection con-
cerns in licensing decisions, because such political signals may conflict 
with established windpower development practices. 
2. Explaining the implementation of windpower licensing 
2.1. Defining implementation 
Implementation, itself a contested term [20,21], refers to the pro-
cess, output or outcome of political decisions or signals within a political 
entity. While goal achievement is often used to evaluate outcomes [22], 
politically adopted goals are not necessarily clear or easy to measure in 
operational terms. In real life there are rarely complete failures or suc-
cesses, because a political goal is usually accompanied by numerous 
other desirable, sometimes competing, political goals and objectives. For 
instance, ensuring nature protection and expanding windpower pro-
duction both represent valid political ends – but the two may often not 
be achieved fully through individual regulatory decisions like wind-
power licensing. Systematic examination of such decisions can reveal 
not only the operational content of policies, but also how implementers 
in practice must prioritize among multiple objectives. 
Here we focus on both implementation process and output, specif-
ically the regulatory decisions adopted by the NVE – or in the case of an 
appeal, by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) – to grant or 
reject construction of windpower plants in Norway. We are primarily 
interested in the extent to which and how nature protection concerns are 
incorporated in regulatory decision-making, and how these licensing 
practices are shaped. 
There is not a single overarching implementation theory, but rather a 
diverse set of perspectives that seek to explain different aspects related 
to implementation [20]. An attempted synthesis model of the various 
strands of implementation research differentiates between the more 
material links between policy formulation and policy design [21] on the 
one hand, and the implementation process (organizational behaviour, 
management, the actions of street-level bureaucrats) on the other. The 
latter is then seen as leading up to implementation output, and ulti-
mately outcomes. To explain implementation output, we focus on the 
implementation process (licensing practices) and how it responds to 
steering signals. After focusing on process, we also consider the out-
comes of windpower licensing, as both process and outcome are deemed 
important in the energy justice literature [23]. We apply two different 
perspectives in a complementary way, to clarify how windpower 
licensing is implemented. 
2.2. Adopted policies explain implementation output: Rational choice 
institutionalism 
Adopted policies might come with a blueprint for implementation, 
but unclear and inconsistent goals, and complex implementation struc-
tures (e.g. fragmented responsibility, multiple levels of action and 
several actors involved) can make it difficult to implement policies as 
intended by rule-makers [24]. The underlying logic is the link between 
formal rules and organizational behaviour. This is in line with a rational 
choice variant of neo-institutional theory [25], which we apply to 
examine the connection between adopted legislation and implementa-
tion output. Rational choice institutionalism sees organizational behaviour 
as the product of formal structure and formal rules [26]: implementing 
actors will follow policy as adopted, and will respond to political 
steering within the public administration. 
Here we understand a ‘steering signal’ as any political signal that 
affects the licensing decision practices of the energy authorities. In 
theory, this could include direct instructions on the one extreme of a 
continuum, and more vague political signals deemed relevant by the 
NVE, on the other. In-between are a wide set of possible steering signals 
– such as official letters of allocation and related meetings, official White 
Papers and reports, governmental political platforms, and windpower 
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licensing appeal decisions by the ministry. 
Political signals may be embedded in legislation adopted in the 
Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) or via ministerial steering of a 
subsumed agency tasked with implementation. Clearer goals or steering 
signals are expected to be prioritized over more ambiguous goals. While 
this is unlikely to be so in all public administrative situations, we expect 
that in those cases where the NVE has received clear steering signals, 
actual licensing practices are more likely to follow the signalled inten-
tion than in situations where inputs have been ambiguous. Further, 
when similar steering signals come through multiple channels and in 
various forms, they are likely to be prioritized over steering signals 
communicated through one channel only. Under this perspective, also 
some other factors may affect implementation: capacity-building in-
struments can help to build implementation capacity for the public 
administration; commitment-building instruments can foster commit-
ment to basic policy goals; and procedural instruments can signal the 
desired course of action to the administration [24]. If such instruments 
support the prioritization of certain goals over others, this should lead 
implementing actors to prioritize those goals higher than other ones. 
Each year, as a follow-up from the state budget, ministries in Norway 
send a ‘letter of allocation’ to their subsumed agencies, outlining the 
objectives for the coming year. Such documents, referred to as ‘perfor-
mance contracts’ in the broader academic literature, are often linked to 
new public management reforms, and are intended to establish ‘clear 
performance measures [that] will provide government agencies with the 
incentive to perform better in the areas emphasized in the contract’ [27: 
58]. Goals that are stated in such letters are expected to be prioritized by 
the agencies in question, as they have to report on such goals, and their 
performance is measured by the ministry. Indeed, a study of Danish 
agencies found high performance on goals that were included in the 
contracts [28]. Thus, we expect the NVE to prioritize the goals included 
in such letters. 
2.3. Implementing entity explains implementation: Historical 
institutionalism 
Implementation output may also be explained by established 
behaviour at the level of the implementing organization, management 
or bureaucrats themselves [22]. Implementation studies show that 
policy regularly faces a serious risk of vertical disintegration: ‘a state of 
affairs where the aggregate thrust of “micro-decisions” deviates more or 
less significantly from what policy doctrines or principles would lead us 
to expect’ [29]. Moreover, Norwegian agency staff in general are 
traditionally more oriented towards sectoral/technical expertise, 
whereas ministry staff are more attuned to their minister (and ministe-
rial deputies) and prioritize loyalty to them [30,31]. Thus, attention to 
political signals can generally be expected to be lower in agencies than 
in ministries. 
Applying historical institutionalism, we expect implementation to be 
shaped by the organizational culture within the implementing organi-
zation. An organizational culture is the historical legacy of an organi-
zation, developed organically over time. However, the initial structure 
and demography may put an organization on a path-dependent devel-
opment course. The initial mandate, along with recruitment patterns, 
may leave its mark on the organization by creating feedback mecha-
nisms that uphold and reinforce initial choices [32,33]. Agencies usually 
recruit specialist staff, whereas ministries tend to hire generalists 
[31,34,35]. Which professions are recruited into each organization over 
time matters, because formal background is an important carrier of 
norms and values (DiMaggio & Powell). Moreover, over time, practices 
may become infused with value, turning means into legitimized ends 
that are hard to change [36]. Organizations develop an institutional self- 
interest, including an interest in autonomy in order to carve out space 
for manoeuvre and discretion. A drifting agency – a bureaucratic agency 
that create policy that deviates from its original mandate – may pursue 
other goals by exploiting information asymmetry vis-à-vis its principal 
[37,38]. With more specialized staff, institutionalized agencies can 
become capable of, and interested, in pursuing other goals – or they may 
prioritize differently among multiple objectives – than their political 
principals in the relevant ministry. 
According to this perspective, we expect the NVE’s organizational 
culture to have shaped practices for balancing among various concerns 
when adopting regulatory decisions on windpower licensing. Moreover, 
its behaviour is likely to be path-dependent, as its practices are resilient 
to political signals that deviate from established procedures. Hence, the 
key expectations from historical institutionalism are that (1) the NVE’s 
organizational culture has profoundly shaped licensing practices, 
including the use of environmental knowledge; and that (2) such prac-
tices have remained relatively unaffected by political steering signals. 
3. Method 
We mapped and coded the annual letters of allocation from the OED 
to the NVE (the ministerial steering documents) for 1998–2019 (N =
22), using NVivo and Excel. Such letters are sent every year as part of the 
budgetary process from the ministries to the public agencies in their 
domain [39]. Overarching goals – also broken down into sub-goals – are 
intended to form the basis for the agency’s work in the coming year. In 
addition, the documents sometimes include ‘prioritized tasks’, which are 
more specific than the goals. We used the main goals in these documents 
as a basis for inductive development of four broad categories: ‘sustain-
able hydro-governance’, ‘efficient and sustainable governance’, ‘energy 
transition’ or ‘security and preparedness’. Goals with similar content but 
slightly differing wording were placed in the same category. The 
prioritized tasks were coded using the same categories. Detailed in-
structions regarding windpower licensing were not found at the level of 
the main goals, so a text search was conducted across all letters to 
identify any content related to windpower. 
We also draw on 22 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018 
and 2019 with 39 representatives from the public administration, 
including ministry and agency staff, regional and local authorities, 
power companies and various stakeholders (see Appendix). Whereas 
interviews with top-level respondents in national ministries and 
agencies were conducted specifically for the purpose of investigating the 
extent to which and how political steering influenced NVE licensing 
practices, the other interviews focused more on the NVE’s handling of 
the licensing process and balancing of multiple and sometimes 
competing objectives, as well as formal and informal influence in the 
licensing process at local, regional and central levels. 
Finally, a dataset of all windpower licence applications in Norway on 
which a final decision had been made provided descriptive statistics on 
several variables and outcomes.1 This dataset was used to identify key 
issues in the licensing process that needed further examination, and to 
triangulate data gathered from the letters of allocation and interviews 
with data from the licensing process. For example, we used the dataset to 
identify the number of windpower applications submitted, the position 
of all host municipalities (yes/no to windpower development), the 
outcome of the licensing process, and the outcome of the appeals 
process. 
4. Licensing practices 
4.1. Legal framework and actors 
In Norway, the licensing process is not governed by local adminis-
trations but by a national sector authority – and, in the case of appeals, a 
ministry. The authority to grant windpower licences lies with the NVE, 
which is a government agency subsumed under the Ministry of Petro-
leum and Energy (OED). The licensing process has always been 
1 This dataset is on file with the authors. 
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controlled by the energy authorities in accordance with the Energy Act 
(1990), but windpower developers previously had to apply to the host 
municipality regarding land-use changes for the windpower planning 
area. Since 2008, the Planning and Building Act has exempted energy 
installations from municipal land-use planning procedures (a lengthy 
process for developers) and granted the energy authorities decision- 
making competence over land-use changes. The energy authorities and 
important stakeholders in the energy sector argued that this change was 
needed to streamline the licensing process, increase efficiency, and meet 
national energy objectives. They were supported by a broad political 
majority in the Storting [40]. Thereby the process was placed fully under 
central state control, with the municipality retaining only the right to be 
heard, like any other hearing party to the licensing process. The place-
ment of the licensing body within a sector authority (NVE) instead of 
general planning has resulted in a process where the licensing body 
enjoys considerable discretion in the process and a very broad mandate 
to decide licensing outcomes. The new Planning and Building Act also 
strengthened those groups that have an interest in windpower devel-
opment, or belong to the energy sector more generally, at the expense of 
environmental and local authorities. 
Although the NVE and, in the case of appeals, the OED are in full 
control of the licensing process, several national and regional authorities 
as well as various stakeholders are heard and may object during the 
process. The Norwegian Environment Agency is consulted and provides 
advice to the NVE, particularly during the development and approval of 
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) programme for the proposed 
project. In the case of appeals, the OED consults the Ministry of Climate 
and Environment, which usually participates at on-sites inspections of 
the proposed windpower project, according to our interviewees in both 
ministries. The main actors at the regional level are the County Council, 
a political body representing the county in question, with formal au-
thority regarding cultural heritage issues, and the Office of the County 
Governor, which is the state’s regional authority for overseeing envi-
ronmental issues. The host municipality, landowners, environmental 
NGOs, and various other stakeholders are heard at the local level. 
Project developers include national and regional power companies 
traditionally active in hydropower (such as Statkraft, Lyse, Trønder 
Energi and Agder Energi) and smaller companies specializing in wind-
power development (such as Norsk Vind, Sarepta and Zephyr). Local 
ownership or citizen co-ownership of windfarms is virtually non- 
existent. On the contrary, Norwegian windfarms are frequently sold to 
international investment funds, which own an increasing share of the 
windpower measured in terms of installed capacity – more than 60% as 
of October 2020.2 
4.2. Formal and informal licensing practices 
All windpower projects larger than 10 MW require a full licensing 
process. Since 2005, an EIA has been required for all projects over 10 
MW [19]. A simplified licensing process and, as of 2017, a simplified EIA 
is required for small projects between 1 and 10 MW [41], but most 
projects are much larger. Based on EIAs, a hearing process and other 
information compiled during the licensing process, the NVE is mandated 
to consider the environmental impacts of a windpower project and 
weigh the benefits against the environmental impacts and other costs 
(Energy Act of 1990). The final licensing decision includes approval of 
land-use changes within the windpower planning area. 
The main stages in the licensing process are shown in Fig. 1. The 
formal licensing process begins with early notification of the project, 
when the project developer has identified a feasible area for windpower 
development and sends notification of the planned project to the NVE 
[42]. The licensing process proceeds through a public hearing of the 
notification and a proposed EIA programme, approval of the EIA pro-
gramme, full licence application, and a public hearing on the applica-
tion. The NVE arranges a first public meeting in the host municipality at 
the stage of project notification, and a second public hearing when the 
project developer has submitted a full application. During the public 
hearings, host municipalities, environmental NGOs, regional author-
ities, affected citizens, and other stakeholders typically submit state-
ments about issues such as nature protection and landscape-level 
concerns, bird life and habitats, noise, visibility, and consequences for 
recreational activities and tourism. In addition, any public authority that 
considers the proposed project as conflicting with its field of competence 
may file a formal objection [41]. These public sector bodies include the 
Norwegian Environment Agency, the Sami authorities (representing the 
indigenous Sami people), the County Councils, the Office of the County 
Governor, and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. The NVE is obliged 
to consider any formal objection from such public authorities and 
organize a mediation meeting to discuss the complaint and possible 
solutions. If the complainant upholds the objection after that meeting, it 
will become a formal ‘appeal’ that must be considered by the OED, 
should the NVE decide to grant the licence [41]. 
In the sixth stage, the NVE decides to grant or decline a licence to 
build and operate the windpower plant, including grid connection. This 
decision is based on all the information submitted and compiled about 
the project and the NVE’s assessment of the advantages of the project 
against the negative impacts. Our examination of all license applications 
handled by the NVE until the end of 2019 shows that out of the 195 
windpower project applications submitted to the NVE, 82 were dis-
missed or withdrawn at an early stage in the licensing process (see 
below). Of the remaining 113 licence applications that reached the stage 
of a formal decision, 26 applications (23%) were rejected and 87 ap-
plications (77%) granted by the NVE. 
Host municipalities, affected citizens, and other stakeholders with 
‘due reason’ may appeal the decision to the OED, which takes the final 
official decision after having organized meetings and on-site inspections 
with the parties involved and considering all relevant information. As 
almost 80% of all windpower decisions were appealed [19], it is usually 
up to the ministry to make the final official decision on whether or not to 
grant a licence. Whereas the ministry rejected 13 licences granted by 
NVE, it granted only one licence rejected by the NVE. After the appeals 
process, 38 out of the 113 applications that reached a formal decision 
(34%) were rejected and 75 applications (66%) granted (see Section 
5.3). 
The NVE is not mandated to reject project notifications and appli-
cations that meet the formal requirements. However, in order to speed 
up the licensing process, the agency has developed an informal practice 
of ‘advising’ developers to withdraw projects that are very unlikely to be 
granted a licence [2]. Developers that receive such advice usually 
withdraw the project. In the period under study, 59 project proposals 
were withdrawn at the notification stage and 12 at the application stage 
[19]. The NVE usually – but not always – mentions several reasons for 
recommending withdrawal of a project, including ‘holistic’ consider-
ations and specific points such as grid connection problems, environ-
mental concerns, or conflicts with indigenous Sami interests or the 
Fig. 1. Main stages in the windpower licensing process in Norway [42]  
2 https://www.nrk.no/nordland/utenlandsk-eierskap- 
kontrollerer-over-60-prosent-av-norsk-vindkraft-1.15059109 
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military [2]. 
Despite the lack of formal authority, the host municipality is a key 
actor in the licensing process. After the changes to the Planning and 
Building Act in 2008, the formal role of the host municipality is similar to 
that of the other hearing parties, but the NVE has rarely granted a 
licence in a negative municipality. Indeed, we find that local munici-
palities have acted as informal ‘veto players’ in the licensing process. 
First, interviewees from the NVE and project developers explained that, 
during the early planning stages of a project, before public notification, a 
negative attitude from the municipality would often result in the 
developer withdrawing the project. Second, NVE interviewees said that 
if the host municipality submitted a negative statement during the 
public hearing of the licence application, in most cases it would be 
decided not to grant a license. Our descriptive statistics confirm this 
statement. In only five cases did the NVE grant a licence when the 
municipality was clearly opposed to windpower development. All five 
municipalities appealed to the OED, which backed four of them. Only in 
one case – the Raudfjell windpower plant in Tromsø municipality – did 
the ministry grant a licence despite an unequivocal ‘no’ vote in the 
municipal council (see also Section 5.3). 
However, because of their lack of land-use planning authority for 
windpower and other energy installations, many host municipalities feel 
marginalized in the process after a license has been granted, when the 
project is realized. In this phase, project developers have been found to 
increase the height of the planned wind turbines significantly (from 100 
up to over 200 m), increase installed capacity, and change access roads 
and project plans. The windpower planning system allows NVE to 
approve such changes without much involvement from the host mu-
nicipalities. Lack of influence in the planning of on-site implementation 
has caused massive resistance in many host communities in recent years 
and substantial opposition to windpower development in other munic-
ipalities, according to our interviewees and numerous news articles. Our 
interviewees and news articles also highlight how the lack of local 
ownership and the escalating share of foreign ownership have led to 
increased conflict levels and local opposition to windpower 
development. 
It also seems clear from the evidence examined and an earlier study 
[2] that there is ongoing informal dialogue involving the NVE, the 
project developer, the local landowner and the host municipality. The 
environmental and regional authorities, environmental NGOs, recrea-
tional interests and other stakeholders are heard and their views are 
considered, but they do not enjoy the same level of privileged access and 
influence in the process as do project developers, landowners and host 
municipalities. The Environment Agency and other administrative or-
gans mandated with environmental or cultural management, such as the 
Office of the County Governor and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, 
do not have significant formal or informal influence in the process. 
We have not found evidence of significant changes in licensing 
practices over time. The NVE has developed routines and practices that 
have been incrementally adjusted but not radically changed during the 
period studied. We find that the NVE has had significant autonomy and 
discretion in handing windpower applications during the entire period 
1998–2019. Interviewees in the NVE and the OED confirm that the 
agency has always operated at arm’s length from the ministry in 
windpower licensing processes. They stressed that the ministry does not 
interfere with the agency’s handling of any specific application before a 
possible appeal. Only when an appeals case comes to the OED will the 
ministry become involved. 
4.3. Environmental considerations 
A notable change to the licensing process was introduced in 2005, 
when the Storting instructed the OED to establish Thematic Conflict 
assessments connected to the licensing process [43]. The Thematic 
Conflict assessments were meant to assess the extent to which wind-
power development in a specific area would conflict with three issue- 
areas: reindeer herding by the Sami people (assessed by Regional 
Reindeer herding authorities), defence interests (assessed by the Nor-
wegian Defence Estates Agency), and cultural heritage and the envi-
ronment (assessed by the Directorate for Cultural Heritage and the 
Norwegian Environment Agency). However, the NVE largely dis-
regarded conflict assessments in the windpower licensing process [41]. 
Interviewees in the NVE found these conflict assessments superfluous, as 
they felt that the topics addressed were adequately assessed in the 
mandatory EIAs for the projects. The Environment Agency and the 
Directorate for Cultural Heritage, however, expressed deep frustration 
that the NVE ignored the conflict assessment in the licensing process. 
The government eventually sided with the NVE and abolished the 
Thematic Conflict assessments in 2016 [44]. 
In deciding whether to grant a license, the NVE is to weigh the 
project benefits against all likely negative impacts in an overall assess-
ment. Its evaluation is to be based on the information in the application, 
public hearings, the EIAs, objections to the application and other in-
formation gathered or submitted during the process. Our interviewees 
confirm that the weighting of different concerns in the process and final 
decision has always been done at the agency’s discretion and that these 
evaluations have been relatively stable over time. 
We find that the NVE has paid particular attention to profitable 
windpower development, wind resources at the location in question, 
grid connections and other technical issues. The negative impacts for 
birds, bats and other species, environmental and landscape-level con-
cerns, and impacts for recreational interests are taken into consideration 
where relevant in the licensing documents, but it is difficult to pinpoint 
exactly how the NVE weighs these impacts in its final determination. 
NVE interviewees claimed that it is impossible for them to put a 
general price or value on, say, a threatened eagle owl population or 
other environmental values. They assess project applications on a case- 
by-case basis, with significant discretion in making their final decision. 
The NVE claims that all cases are evaluated according to the same de-
cision criteria, but it is hard to see how the agency weighs the benefits 
against the impacts of the project in its final decision. Although the NVE 
maintains that ‘holistic’ consideration of all benefits and costs is the 
basis for the final determination, it remains unclear exactly how all the 
documented impacts of a project are aggregated and then weighted 
against the benefits. Factors that can be measured, including wind re-
sources and profitability, often appear to trump environmental consid-
erations and other non-material concerns that, according to NVE, are 
more difficult to measure. That said, windpower development is pro-
hibited in some areas, such as national parks and other protected areas, 
and the NVE has developed certain ‘rules of thumb’ and informal 
practices about locating windpower plants and turbines some distance 
away from environmentally sensitive sites, such as eagle owl nesting 
places. The overall picture, however, is that the NVE gives high priority 
to opportunities to increase renewable energy production at reasonable 
cost, and there are surprisingly few guidelines about environmental is-
sues in windpower siting considerations. This give rise to questions 
about the transparency and predictability of the process, as the weight 
accorded to different factors for and against granting a licence – 
particularly environmental considerations – is unclear in NVE’s final 
decision. The lack of transparency and clarity on the weighting of 
different concerns in the final determination also makes it hard to pre-
dict the outcome for similar project applications. 
5. Steering signals and changes over time 
5.1. Renewable energy targets and green certificate market 
Until 1999, project developers showed little interest in realizing 
windpower projects in Norway due to high costs, low profitability, and 
lack of effective support schemes. In 1999, the Storting adopted a goal of 
3 TWh windpower production by 2010 [45]. At the time, that was an 
ambitious goal with firm political backing, supported by government 
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subsidies (investment support) first allocated by the NVE, and then from 
the state-owned enterprise Enova from 2001 onwards. However, the 3 
TWh windpower target was not achieved: by the end of 2010, yearly 
electricity production from onshore wind turbines measured only 1 
TWh, or less than 1% of Norway’s total electricity production. That 
period was characterized by high ambitions but slow development [7]. 
Since the end of 2010, windpower development in Norway has been 
supported primarily by the common green electricity certificate market 
with Sweden, which was agreed by the two governments in December 
2010 and came into operation from 2012. The scheme had a common 
target of 26.4 TWh new renewable electricity supply by 2020, later 
raised to 28.4TWh [44: 197]. Under the 2009 EU Renewable Energy 
Directive, Norway has agreed to a target of 67.5% renewable energy in 
total energy consumption by 2020. Payment for the green electricity 
certificates and crediting of Sweden and Norway under the Renewable 
Energy Directive is divided equally between the two countries. Under 
the green certificate scheme, renewable electricity producers receive 
certificates for each MW they produce. These certificates, valid for 15 
years, can be traded to energy suppliers, who are obliged by law to fulfil 
a certain quota of renewable energy. 
In 2016, the Norwegian government extended the green certificate 
scheme to the end of 2021, but decided that participation in the scheme 
would not be further extended [44]. This meant that those who enter the 
certificate market by the final entry deadline at the end of 2021 may sell 
green certificates until the end of 2036. More broadly, the period since 
the turn of the millennium can be characterized by market-oriented 
political thinking and prioritization of profitable power development – 
but also growing concerns for climate change and windpower deploy-
ment as part of a low-carbon transition. 
The green certificate market resulted in a boost of windpower ap-
plications, further encouraged by falling windpower instalment costs. 
NVE staff describe this as a ‘Klondike period’ that put the licensing 
system under severe strain. Almost 200 windpower project applications 
had been submitted to the NVE: according to law, the agency could not 
dismiss applications administratively, but it requested many developers 
to withdraw applications for what were deemed unfeasible projects. The 
NVE gave high priority to speeding up the licensing process, and 
received funding over the state budget to increase staff capacity for 
handling licensing applications. Ten new employees were recruited to 
the agency. Still, in 2014 the Office of the Auditor General, which 
monitors the public sector on behalf of the Storting, published a report 
criticizing the NVE for its slow handling of licence applications: on 
average, it took the NVE five-and-a-half years to grant a windpower 
licence [46]. 
5.2. Ministry steering via letters of allocation 1998–2019 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) steers the NVE through 
annual letters of allocation (see also methods section). Each year, the 
agency receives a letter from the ministry outlining its funding along 
with a list of goals and prioritized tasks. Each letter includes multiple 
goals, but the number and content of these vary somewhat from year to 
year. Moreover, because some goals concern the same substantive topic, 
we merged them into the same broad category. The most frequently 
listed goals across the 22 letters of allocation belong to the category 
efficient and sustainable governance. This was also the most frequent 
category for the prioritized task. Table 1 gives an overview of the ab-
solute number of times a goal of a certain category was included, and its 
relative share of the total number of goals (and similarly for prioritized 
tasks). 
Fig. 2 presents the various categories of main goals. Grouped into 
four categories, the absolute number of main goals in each letter (i.e. per 
year) varied between 4 and 7. A large share of the main goals dealt with 
(1) efficient and sustainable governance of the energy sector. This category 
included goals such as efficient trade, transmission, and value creation 
in the energy sector as well as effective handling of licensing 
applications. However, we see a relative decline in goals within this 
category towards the end of the period, as the share of goals belonging to 
the category of (2) security and preparedness gained importance from 
2013 onwards. Examples of goals within this category are flood, 
avalanche, and landslide protection. Categorized as (3) sustainable 
hydro-governance, goals relating specifically to hydropower (e.g. sus-
tainable watercourse management) were also common throughout the 
entire period. As hydropower is the most important source of electricity 
in Norway, and against the backdrop of historical social protest sur-
rounding dam construction, this is not surprising. Finally, goals related 
to (4) energy transition turned up occasionally – in the late 1990s and 
2007/2008 – and must be seen in light of Norway’s already decarbon-
ized electricity sector. In sum, the relationship among the categories of 
main goals has remained rather stable over time. 
Prioritized tasks were included in the allocation letters from 2007 
onwards – usually in a separate section, although subsumed under the 
overarching targets during the years 2013–2016. For the prioritized 
tasks, we find much greater volatility over time, in terms of shifting 
priorities and in the absolute number of prioritized tasks per year 
(ranging between 3 and 10). Sustainable hydro-governance has featured 
occasionally; and there was a burst of prioritized tasks related to the 
energy transition around 2010 and the following few years. In relative 
figures, prioritized tasks related to efficient and sustainable governance 
were clearly prevalent until 2018 (50% average, 2007–2017), followed 
by a sharp decline due to the relative growth in tasks related to the other 
three categories (see Fig. 3). 
Beyond main goals and prioritized tasks, a text search for 
windpower-related terms showed that the OED has highlighted issues 
like capacity-building and knowledge in these allocation letters, 
repeatedly requesting the NVE to improve the efficiency of its licensing 
processes. For instance, the letter for 2007 requested the NVE to increase 
its capacity significantly for processing licensing applications of pow-
erlines, district heating, windpower and new hydropower, and contin-
uously work on measures to make the process more efficient. In 2009, 
the OED instructed the NVE to strengthen its capacity for processing 
licensing applications and to work with the ministry on considering 
measures to ensure that applications for good windpower projects would 
be swiftly and efficiently processed. The letters for 2010, 2011 and 2012 
noted the same issues as did the 2009 letter, adding that the agency 
should coordinate licensing processing to ensure adequate coordination 
of and prioritization among new energy installations. 
The letters also show that the OED instructed the NVE to build or 
expand its expertise on environmental issues related to windpower. In 
2010, for example, the ministry requested the agency to approve 
detailed plans for construction, specific turbine placements, transport 
and environment for new energy installations, and to ensure that envi-
ronmental and security requirements were followed. The ministry also 
requested that environmental oversight of windpower installations be 
strengthened. In 2012, the NVE was instructed to build more expertise 
on the consequences of windpower and powerlines for birdlife and 
reindeer. 
Table 1 
Distribution across categories.  
Goals Frequency Share 
Sustainable hydro-governance 22 21% 
Efficient and sustainable governance 43 42% 
Energy transition 6 6% 
Security and preparedness 32 31% 
Total targets 103   
Prioritized tasks Frequency Share 
Sustainable hydro-governance 6 7% 
Efficient and sustainable governance 37 41% 
Energy transition 20 22% 
Security and preparedness 27 30% 
Total prioritized tasks 90   
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From 2013 to 2017, windpower was not mentioned in the letters. 
However, in 2018 and 2019, the NVE was requested to develop a pro-
posal for a national framework plan for windpower. This included 
updating information on the impacts of windpower; suitable areas for 
windpower were also to be identified. In 2018, the agency was 
instructed to ensure that conditions set in the licensing decision were 
complied with via measures for ensuring the efficient and responsible 
processing of post-licence detailed planning for windpower plants. 
In sum, the references to windpower in the letters of allocation show 
that the OED repeatedly requested the NVE to increase its expertise on 
environmental issues related to windpower, to speed up the licensing 
process, and to process certain applications more expeditiously than 
others – especially projects that would contribute to improved security 
of supply. However, the ministry did not provide any steering signals 
regarding how to consider and weigh nature protection concerns in the 
licensing process. 
5.3. The appeals process: Signalling priority areas through decision 
patterns 
We find that 88 out of the 113 licensing decisions by NVE were 
appealed to the OED – by developers, in the case of a rejection; by op-
ponents, in the case of a licence granted. Whereas 18 out of 26 rejected 
applications were appealed by developers, 70 out of 87 granted licenses 
were appealed by opponents. 
By upholding licensing decisions, the OED confirms the assessments 
and decisions made by the NVE. Conversely, by overturning licensing 
decisions, OED sends signals that the NVE may have to adjust its 
licensing practices, particularly if the ministry systematically accords a 
different weight to specific factors than does the agency. Interviewees in 
the NVE maintained that appeal decisions from the OED provide 
important guidance about the weighting of various concerns in the 
licensing process. 
Table 2 shows the grand total of 88 appeals with a final decision 
made by the OED 2005–2020 (onshore windpower projects over 10 MW 
installed effect). We see that the OED rejected a decision by the NVE to 
grant a licence in 13 out of 88 cases, or almost 15% of the total number 
of appeals. By contrast, the ministry overturned the agency decision to 
reject a licence in only one out of the 88 cases. Although the OED has 
upheld the NVE’s decisions in most cases, it rejects more licences than 
the NVE does, indicating a stricter practice. 
The grounds for rejecting licences granted by the NVE vary, but the 
OED tends to be more sensitive to political signals. Here we can note the 
rejection of licences granted by the NVE in which the municipality in 
question voted against windpower development. Since 2013, through 
government platforms and other political statements, previous and 
current governments headed by the Conservative Party have clearly 
signalled that the local municipalities should have a strong voice in the 
licensing process. Thus far, the municipalities have in practice been veto 
players that can block almost any windpower application. As examined 
in Section 4, the NVE granted a licence in only five cases when the 
municipality was clearly opposed, and the OED decided to uphold only 
one of them after the appeals process. These cases indicate that although 
the NVE has given strong weight to signals from the government about 
local influence in the licensing process, the OED attaches even greater 
weight to political signals from the government. This impression was 
confirmed by interviewees, as this quote illustrates: 
The municipality’s position is even more important for the ministry 
than it is for the NVE. For a quite long time we’ve had ministers who 
don’t want to challenge the will of the municipalities in this issue-area 
(…) There you see the difference between a public agency and a polit-
ically governed ministry. 
Moreover, interviewees highlight that the OED puts greater weight 
on cost–benefit assessments than does the NVE. Projects with low profit 
margins are less likely to be approved by the ministry, although several 
other factors influence the decision as well. One example is Maurneset in 
Troms county (Northern Norway), where the NVE granted a licence but 
the OED overturned the decision because of very low profitability [47]. 
According to the ministry, the low profit margins compared to other 
projects meant that the advantages of the project would not outweigh its 
environmental and societal costs. Hence, it was not the need to protect 
particular species or nature types that convinced the OED to overturn 
the NVE’s decision, but the low profit margins involved. 
Other reasons for overturning an NVE decision to grant a licence 
have included concerns for the Sami people’s reindeer herding rights 
and other customary rights, wild reindeer, threated species (e.g. the 
Eurasian eagle owl), nature protection, and landscape-level impacts. In 
two cases, the OED overturned the NVE decision because parts of the 
windpower planning areas lay within nationally designated wild- 
reindeer areas. In a few other cases, concern for the customary rights 
of the Sami people have been the key reason for overturning an NVE 
decision to grant a licence. In only one case (Kvitvola), did the OED 
overturn NVE’s granting of a licence primarily because of landscape- 
level concerns and other environmental considerations. As the OED 
and the NVE tend to agree on most licensing decisions, we cannot 
conclude that the ministry generally accords greater weight to 
Fig. 2. Relative distribution of main goals across four categories over time.  
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environmental considerations than does the NVE. 
6. The NVE: Internal culture and legacy 
Before assessing the extent to which and how steering signals influ-
ence licensing practices, we briefly review the NVE’s historical legacy 
and internal culture as mediating factors. Established as a separate 
agency in 1921, the NVE gradually expanded in step with growing hy-
dropower production in Norway, especially in the decades following the 
Second World War. After a 1960 reform, the agency consisted of four 
directorates, of which one focused on waterways management and 
another on electricity licensing. The former included a nature protection 
office from 1966, which became part of the Nature and Landscape 
Department in 1977. Ownership of power production and transmission – 
by and large completely public – was initially located within the agency. 
This was transferred into publicly owned companies or public enter-
prises in connection with the liberalization of the electricity sector in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s [48]. 
An external report from 2016 maps describes the NVE’s internal 
culture as being anchored in a narrative of ‘building the country’ [49]. 
This is linked with the earlier organization of the agency, where it was 
an integral part of state utility Statkraft. Back then, most of the central 
grid was owned by Statkraft, generating around one third of the nation’s 
electricity [49]. Statkraft was split up before the deregulation of the 
sector that came into effect in 1991, but there are some indications of a 
remaining culture of engineering and a certain pride in having 
contributed to the ‘building of the country’ prior to deregulation. For 
example, the NVE is still the official organizer of the annual Windpower 
Energy Conference, which mainly targets windpower developers and 
wider business concerns. At the 2019 conference, one NVE presenter, 
speaking on trends of increasing wind turbine size, stated with great 
enthusiasm: ‘we were really excited to see that now the 6 MW turbines 
are coming!’ This and similar statements appeared to exceed the role of a 
neutral licensing authority, indicating organizational cultural in-
clinations in the agency. Our respondents from other agencies confirmed 
the ‘building the country’ narrative in the NVE, adding that it has a clear 
mandate of contributing to energy development in Norway. 
The 2016 external report further points out that the organizational 
culture has been reasonably similar throughout the agency, with some 
variations among departments. For example, the licensing department 
tends to focus on bureaucratic case-management [49], indicating also a 
professional culture with role-awareness. For a long time, the power 
producers were part of the organization; the organizational demography 
reflected this with an engineer-dominated approach to organizational 
practices that has remained to this day. After the liberalization of the 
sector with the major electricity reform of 1991 there have also been 
significant cultural changes. In particular, the swift transition and 
layering of the NVE organizational culture have added complexity by 
developing an economics-oriented focus [50]. This cultural change has 
had implications for weighing investment decisions relating to climate- 
change adaptation, where the economic rationale (narrowly under-
stood) has taken precedence over other considerations and is likely to 
have influence also on the licensing department’s practices. This can be 
seen in the changes in the professional demography from 1991 onwards. 
Before the deregulation reform, the main profession represented in the 
sector was the engineer, but today the dominant professional back-
ground is the economist; non-economists often supplement their 
competence with economics courses [50]. However, our respondents in 
both NVE and other agencies highlighted that professionals in NVE’s 
licensing department to a large extent had similar educational back-
grounds to those working with similar issues in the Norwegian Envi-
ronment Agency. The dominant educational background in the licensing 
department is nature management studies – not economics or engi-
neering. According to our respondents, employees in the licensing 
department become socialized into the broader NVE culture of econo-
mist and technocrats, so that their educational background is trumped 
by the agency’s organization culture. 
7. Explaining licensing practices 
7.1. Impact of political steering 
The key expectation from rational choice institutionalism was that 
the NVE will respond to political steering and adjust licensing practices 
according to steering signals. Our findings show that while political 
steering has not addressed licensing practices as such, the NVE has been 
Fig. 3. Relative distribution of prioritized tasks across four categories over time.  
Table 2 
Outcomes after the appeals process, 2005–2020.  
Appeal outcomes N Percentage 
OED upholds NVE’s yes decision (licence granted) 57  64.8 
OED overturns NVE’s no decision (licence granted) 1  1.1 
OED upholds NVE’s no decision (licence rejected) 16  18.2 
OED overturns NVE’s yes decision (licence rejected) 13  14.8 
OED rejects appeal due to formalities 1  1.1 
SUM 88  100.0  
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under political pressure to increase the pace of windpower development 
by granting more licences. It is hard to pinpoint specific cases in which 
political pressure has tipped the scale and resulted in a licence granted 
that otherwise would not have been approved, but we find indications 
that political pressures have affected the NVE’s overall cost–benefit 
considerations in licensing decisions. Although the weighting of 
different factors for and against granting specific licences is unclear, 
political pressure on the agency to grant more licenses seems to have 
increased the weight accorded to the benefits of windpower development 
in the final determinations. 
Unsurprisingly, the letters of allocation issued by the OED have 
focused more on policy-changes related to energy, and less on policy- 
changes from other areas. This is seen in the inclusion of political tar-
gets for expanding renewables production, whereas environmental 
legislation like the 2009 Nature Diversity Act has not been mentioned. 
Moreover, the ministry has stressed that the NVE should take into ac-
count security of supply and renewable targets in making licensing de-
cisions. NVE interviewees confirmed these signals, adding that when the 
political goal is to increase the share of renewables, they must prioritize 
that goal. Further, they highlighted the strong signals from the ministry 
to prioritize increased energy provision in mid-Norway 2007–2008, the 
target of 3TWh windpower production by 2010, and Norway’s 
commitment to a target of 67.5% renewable energy in total consumption 
under the 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive. Interviewees in both 
the OED and the NVE confirmed that specific targets for expanding 
renewable energy production had influenced licensing practices. 
Although the letters stressed that the NVE should take a range of issues 
into consideration, it was not specified how these issues should be 
balanced when processing licence applications. Our respondents 
confirmed this, noting that the political goals for renewable energy were 
added to only one end of the scale – increasing the pressure for expan-
sion of renewable power. 
Concerning the balancing of more specific concerns in licensing de-
cisions, NVE interviewees referred to appeal decisions from the ministry 
as their major source for calibrating licensing practices. Although such 
decisions cannot be applied on a case-to-case basis to determine 
licensing outcomes, they serve as an important reference point regarding 
the balancing of different concerns in licensing decisions. 
The ministry is generally stricter that the agency in its appeal de-
cisions. Of a total of 88 appeals in the period studied, the ministry 
overturned 14 NVE decisions. In only one case did it change a ‘no’ de-
cision to a ‘yes’, whereas in 13 cases the ministry overturned a ‘yes’ to a 
‘no’ decision. Its reasons for rejecting a licence granted by the agency 
vary, but we find that the ministry has accorded greater weight to the 
stance taken by local authorities. Our interviewees saw this as a strong 
ministerial signal that the NVE should accord more weight to the stance 
of the local municipalities. 
The interviews and the licensing documents also indicate that the 
OED may put more weight on environmental considerations in some 
cases, particularly when the profit margins are low. One statement by 
from interviewee 22 (OED) is illustrative: ‘Low profit margins in a 
project will influence our overall assessment, because there will always 
be non-measurable impacts for the environment, landscapes and 
particular species that we have to consider [against the benefits of a 
project]’. One specific example of this is seen in the ministry’s over-
turning a ‘yes’ to a ‘no’ decision in the case of Maurneset, in North 
Norway. In its final determination, the ministry stated: ‘Maurneset 
windpower plant will not be able to generate sufficient income to 
compensate for negative impacts for property owners, recreational 
homes, landscapes, reindeer herding, and other public interests related 
to the environment’ [47]. 
Interviewees mentioned a few other cases where, due to environ-
mental considerations, the OED had overturned an NVE decision to 
grant a licence. Windpower projects that were planned to lie partly or 
fully within nationally designated areas for wild reindeer were noted as 
a reason for overturning an NVE ‘yes’ decision. We cannot conclude 
decisively regarding the impact on licensing practices, but interviews 
and written sources indicate that the ministry’s determinations seem to 
have influenced the agency’s weighing of project benefits against 
negative impacts, particularly as the latter now attaches more weight to 
environmental impact in projects with very low profit margins. Such 
considerations may tip the scale, resulting in a ‘no’ decision for a project 
that earlier would probably have been granted a licence. 
To summarize, we find that whereas the ministry has highlighted the 
need to increase renewable energy production in Norway, it has not 
provided specific guidance on the handling of different concerns in the 
licensing process. The Office of the Auditor General has also pointed out 
that steering signals from the national political level have been rather 
unclear in the case of windpower development [46]. Vague or no 
steering helps to explain the considerable discretion enjoyed by the NVE 
in the licensing process, and the development of informal practices. The 
growth in licensing applications since around 2005 also seems to have 
spurred the development of informal practices aimed at coping with the 
workload. 
7.2. Impact of the NVE’s culture and legacy 
The key expectations from historical institutionalism were, first, that 
the NVE’s organizational culture has profoundly shaped licensing 
practices; second, that such practices have remained relatively unaf-
fected by political steering signals. Empirical support for these expec-
tations comes from our finding that licensing practices appear to have 
remained quite stable. Importantly, they do not vary sharply or signif-
icantly between the political steering input identified. Basically, these 
practices put significant weight on material and ‘measurable’ factors 
such as local wind resources, grid connections and economic aspects of 
the project, considerations of whether the granting of licences is in line 
with the national goals of increasing windpower production, and 
weighing such factors against the negative impacts of the project. We 
also noted the discrepancy between the formal licensing requirements 
and the more informal practices established by the NVE, which accords a 
special role to the host municipalities, project developers and land-
owners in the licensing process. 
Interviewees from the NVE and the OED generally confirmed the 
distinct separation of powers in connection with individual licence ap-
plications: the NVE, which handles these applications in the first 
instance, never experiences inputs from the OED at this stage. This 
separation of powers contributes to the high degree of discretion 
available to the NVE, including how environmental impacts are 
weighted, and also regarding the interpretation of steering signals. All 
this gives considerable room for the NVE’s internal culture to influence 
licensing decisions. 
This internal culture has been described as anchored in the narrative 
of ‘building the country’ [49]. As the NVE, with all its departments, is 
located in the same building (and at some distance from OED offices in 
downtown Oslo), and its staff share a strong sense of belonging to the 
same organizational identity [49], it is unlikely that the licensing 
department is isolated from the general culture of the NVE. This 
department has, as noted, been characterized as having a culture with a 
strong focus on bureaucratic case-management and professionalism 
[49]. Indeed, our respondents from NVE and other agencies explain that 
employees in the licensing department become socialized into the 
broader NVE culture and have a strong sense of professional role- 
awareness. 
Concerning the mindset of NVE staff in the licensing department, our 
interviews indicate an unwillingness to specify how different concerns 
should be weighed across cases, with a strong emphasis on assessing 
each application on a case-by-case basis. This thinking was criticized by 
interviewees in the Norwegian Environment Agency as creating what 
they saw as a practice whereby nature protection concerns were 
devalued in several cases. The interviews and our examination of 
licensing decisions confirm that energy provision and energy security 
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rank high on the NVE priority list. One example is the licensing decision 
in mid-Norway (the Svarthammeren/Pållifjellet project) where the NVE 
acknowledged that granting the licence would result in loss of signifi-
cant wilderness areas, but maintained that ‘large-scale windpower 
development in mid-Norway will be a good measure to secure Norway’s 
commitment to increase renewable energy production’[51]. 
NVE interviewees confirm that concerns for energy provision and 
profitable energy development have been decisive factors in licensing 
decisions, reflecting not only the mandate of the agency but also its 
organizational culture and identity. As one interviewee explained, ‘We 
are an energy agency, not an environmental agency’ (Interview 
25.06.2019). The NVE also acknowledges that lack of information on 
bird migration patterns and bats and other environmental issues is a 
problem, although it does not seem to apply the precautionary principle 
in its assessments. The only issue where it has stated clearly that the 
precautionary principle applies concerns the impacts of proposed pro-
jects on reindeer herding by the indigenous Sami people [52]. 
Another finding is that staff in the OED seem to pay greater attention 
to political signals than do NVE staff – hardly surprising, given that latter 
operate at some distance from the central government. We also find that 
whereas staff in the NVE have varied educational and professional 
backgrounds, ministerial staff who deal with licensing come almost 
exclusively from the legal profession – which could help to explain their 
focus on rules, regulations, and other steering signals from the 
government. 
Among non-NVE interviewees, opinion differs as to whether the 
licensing authority should calculate the economic aspects of each project 
in such detail as today, or whether such calculations should be left to the 
windpower development companies themselves. Regardless, NVE 
licensing decisions are based on substantial calculations of the economic 
factors of each project – where the decision as to which factors to include 
in these calculations is determined by convention and practices devel-
oped over time. 
Thus, we find that ministerial steering signals and the NVE’s internal 
culture push in the same direction, reinforcing each other. Signals from 
the OED indicate a clear focus on increasing renewable energy pro-
duction, without specifying how the NVE should weigh the benefits of 
windpower projects against the negative impacts. The NVE’s de facto 
autonomy in processing windpower licensing applications leaves room 
for organizational culture to influence practice. Although the profes-
sional backgrounds of staff in the NVE’s windpower licensing section are 
quite similar to those of the staff in the Environment Agency, their 
thinking and practices are influenced by the NVE’s historical identity as 
an energy agency and its strong culture of professional role-awareness 
and bureaucratic case-management. 
Combined, these factors – the OED’s focus on the expansion of 
renewable energy, without specifying how the NVE should weigh 
different concerns, and the NVE’s techno-economic culture of ‘building 
the country’ – can explain the strong weight accorded to economic and 
other material considerations in windpower licensing practices. This 
focus on ‘measurable’ factors does not imply that NVE ignores nature 
protection concerns or other environmental impacts, but the agency has 
resisted ‘putting a price’ on nature or developing multi-criteria tools and 
methodologies for nature valuation. Licensing practices are clearly 
influenced by the formal role and the institutional culture of the NVE as 
an energy agency. 
8. Conclusions 
The licensing process and land-use change decisions are fully under 
the control of the energy authorities in Norway. The energy agency NVE 
enjoys significant autonomy in the licensing process, with considerable 
room for administrative discretion in licensing decisions. We also find 
that lack of political steering as to how the NVE should handle the 
licensing process helps to explain the development of informal NVE 
practices, which accord a special role to host municipalities, project 
developers, and landowners in the process [2]. Through annual letters of 
allocation, the OED has clearly signalled the need to increase renewable 
energy production, but without specifying how the NVE should weigh 
the benefits of windpower projects against negative environmental im-
pacts. In these letters, the ministry has not given any signals about na-
ture protection or other environmental concerns in licensing processes: 
assessment of the negative impacts of windpower project has been up to 
the NVE. Although we cannot conclude that the NVE systematically 
prioritizes windpower development at the expense of nature protection, 
we do find it difficult to determine the weight accorded to nature con-
servation concerns when the NVE decides to grant or reject a licensing 
application. Our examination of all windpower licence appeals handled 
by the OED shows that it tends to be stricter than the NVE in several 
assessments, although most NVE decisions are upheld. Evidence in-
dicates that the ministry tends to give more weight to a ‘no’ to a licence 
in the municipalities and in a few cases to Sami reindeer herding or 
environmental concerns. 
Recent years have seen massive windpower conflicts in Norway, 
particularly between nature protection and recreational interests on the 
one hand, and project developers and renewable energy interests on the 
other hand. In place of the scrapped 2019 national framework plan for 
windpower development, the government in June 2020 presented a 
White Paper proposing reform of the licensing process [53]. By 
November 2020, it became clear that the political opposition at the 
Storting wanted more far-reaching changes – specifically, that the 
Planning and Building Act should no longer exempt windpower in-
stallations from municipal land-use planning procedures. Eventually, 
the government agreed with the political opposition in connection with 
the discussion of the windpower White Paper in the Storting. This 
agreement about changing the legal framework for siting decisions 
essentially means that affected host municipalities can veto future 
windpower development in their planning areas. 
It is too early to assess the possible changes to future windpower 
siting decisions, but the NVE is likely to remain in charge of the licensing 
process, while windpower developers will have to apply to the host 
municipality for land-use changes. The conflicts between the energy 
agency and nature protection interests may be expected to persist, but 
these conflicts could be dampened by municipal land-use planning 
procedures and a reduced windpower development rate in the years 
ahead. Our study indicates that a formal division of powers between the 
central and local levels and between the energy authorities and envi-
ronmental authorities could be more effective in balancing conflicting 
interests – and as a conflict dampening tool – than a limited reform of the 
licensing process. Although the centralised Norwegian licensing model 
may have been well suited for meeting national energy objectives effi-
ciently, this model has resulted in serious conflicts between the central 
and local levels as well as between energy and nature protection in-
terests. The planned changes to the legal framework for windpower 
siting decisions seem overdue indeed. 
More generally, this study shows that more research is needed on 
how political steering influences potential conflicts and trade-offs be-
tween renewable energy development and nature protection in licensing 
practices. Given the serious conflicts over windpower development and 
nature protection concerns in recent years, it is surprising that the OED 
has refrained from providing steering signals about how the NVE should 
weigh nature protection concerns or requested the agency to work more 
closely with national and regional environmental authorities. Clearer 
guidance on these issues might have resulted in better collaboration 
between the energy agency and environmental authorities, better out-
comes for the environment, and greater public acceptance of windpower 
projects where they are realized. Research on licensing processes in 
other countries could usefully examine to what extent and how political 
steering has influenced environmental considerations in permit pro-
cedures, and with what consequences for acceptance of windpower. 
While licensing practices should be transparent and predictable, the 
ability of a licensing authority, as part of a governmental structure, to be 
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responsive to political steering is important, because the system must be 
able to adapt to new ecological knowledge and environmental consid-
erations [19] and adjust practices in response to procedural concerns 
and conflicts. Recent controversies regarding windpower in Norway and 
elsewhere reflect issues about procedural and outcome fairness and 
justice concerns [4,23,54,55], in turn reflected in acceptance problems 
and local opposition [16,56]. More research on renewables permitting is 
needed to shed light on the links between political steering, licensing 
practices and outcomes, and public acceptance of renewables deploy-
ment, and to enhance our understanding of the connections between the 
many aspects of energy justice. 
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